INTRODUCTION

The long-awaited International Policy Statement (IPS), published by the government in April 2005, lays out important initiatives to strengthen a distinctive Canadian foreign policy with increased investment in development, diplomacy and defence. The Statement builds on initiatives already taken by the government to increase Canadian aid, while continuing to focus on sectors and programs that will make vital contributions to poverty reduction in a select number of countries. The government reaffirmed its commitment to concentrate diplomatic, defence and development resources in “whole-of-government” efforts, particularly in response to conflict and failed and fragile states.

The Statement underscores the central importance of multilateralism to a more equitable and peaceful world. Canada will continue to build international consensus for the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ civilian populations in crisis zones around the world, a United Nations initiative in which Canada played a decisive role. The Prime Minister, in his introduction to the IPS, has broadened this notion of “responsibility” to five complementary responsibilities – respect the fundamental rights of all people, deny terrorists the means to attack innocent civilians, work with the needs of people living in poverty to improve their lives, and ensure sustainable development for future generations. Finally, the IPS makes a welcomed commitment to invest human and financial resources for the Canadian Forces in supporting peace operations in various conflict areas.

These initiatives, along with others in the IPS, are important steps towards a progressive foreign policy in which Canada takes leadership in confronting urgent issues of global justice. But at the same time, the Statement fails to put global justice issues at the centre of the government’s international agenda. As noted by the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, it lacks a strategic analysis of global issues in which to situate Canada’s strengths and weaknesses in contributing to progress. It fails to acknowledge and build upon the government’s fundamental obligations to international human rights law; nowhere is there a sufficiently clear commitment to work with the international community through the United Nations.

The reference point for CCIC’s assessment of the IPS is the set of proposals the Council made to the government in a series of papers and discussions with the government in 2004. The proposals constitute a map for putting poverty eradication and human rights at the centre of Canada’s foreign policy. In what follows, CCIC sets out some short reflections in each area of concern – strengthening aid to reduce poverty; contributing to peace; promoting trade justice and pro-poor private sector development; jumpstarting multilateralism; and engaging Canadians. This assessment will inform CCIC’s proposals to change, sharpen and deepen the initiatives laid out in the IPS so that they might more directly address the central importance of poverty eradication and human rights in Canadian foreign policy.

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GLOBAL POVERTY AT THE CENTRE OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

1. The Place of Poverty in Canadian Foreign Policy

Issues of poverty are addressed substantially only in the Development paper. While there are repeated references to “Canadian values” in the Overview, the ethical imperative to end global poverty is largely absent. Rather, the obligation to address global poverty is seen as subsidiary and instrumental to the pursuit of Canada’s particular interests in promoting its own prosperity, reducing threats of global terrorism and responding to regional insecurity. The Statement promotes a one-sided view of Global Citizenship: Canada has much to contribute based on our skills and resources, but very little responsibility for the global conditions that sustain poverty and inequality. Addressing poverty as a human rights obligation is nowhere articulated; rather, references to human rights are intertwined with discussions of Canadian values and cultural relativism. CCIC asserts that Canada’s foreign policy should be based on an imperative to end poverty rooted in our primary obligation to uphold international human rights law.

See Prime Minister’s Forward, Overview, pages 4-5.

Questions

- What should be the central purposes driving Canadian foreign policy?
- Where are Canada’s international human rights obligations reflected in the IPS?
- How can international human rights obligations be reflected in the document?

STRENGTHENING AID TO REDUCE POVERTY: MORE AND BETTER AID

2. Poverty Reduction Mandate for International Assistance

While poverty reduction is included in the five objectives set out for CIDA programming, it is worrying that the first objective noted is to advance Canadian values and interests in security, prosperity and governance. The IPS lacks a clear mandate for Canada’s international assistance that makes poverty reduction, situated within Canada’s human rights obligations, the exclusive goal. A legislated mandate for Canadian international assistance, which has been supported in a recent three-party letter to the Prime Minister, would address this short-coming in the foreign policy statement.

See Development, page 2.

3. Timetable to Reach 0.7%

The IPS acknowledges that Canadian aid will increase beyond 2010, but fails to commit to a timetable to achieve the UN target of 0.7% of Canada’s Gross National Income by 2015. CCIC currently projects aid at 0.33% of GNI in 2010 and 0.37% in 2015 if aid increases each year by 8%. The IPS commitments “to accelerate the projected rate of growth” for aid, and double aid by 2010 “at a minimum”, suggest that there are openings for aid increases beyond the committed
8% to 2010. The Prime Minister argues he is not prepared to lock in the 0.7% by 2015 until it is certain that it can be achieved. But surely Canada is uniquely placed among the rich countries to commit to the universally recognised international target. Canada has a robust and growing economy, a federal government with a reliable record of surplus finances, and citizens who consistently demand that this country meet its international obligations to the world’s poor.

See Prime Minister *Forward*, page 2; *Development*, page 7.

### 4. Country and Sector Focus for the Aid Program

Increased country and sector focus for Canadian bilateral aid is welcome. The choice of sectors is largely appropriate for poverty reduction with the exception of the omission of agriculture (see below). Significantly, the sector strategies continue the systematic and explicit integration of gender equality results across all programming of Canada’s development cooperation. It is important for the government to work toward more equal participation of women in decision-making processes at all levels, the enhanced ability of women and girls to realise their full human rights, and a greater access to and control over resources for women.

The choice of countries largely represents those where poverty is a primary consideration. At the same time, the criteria used to determine aid concentration in the IPS includes the ability to use aid effectively, according to the UNDP Human Development Index and the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) (along with the level of poverty and Canadian presence). The use of the CPIA is problematic as a policy reference: developed by an unaccountable institution, the rankings are non-transparent and highly politicized.

### 5. Agriculture and CIDA's Sector Priorities

The CIDA sector strategies laid out in the IPS have a critical flaw. Despite the fact that the vast majority of the world’s poor live in rural areas, the IPS’s *Development* paper abandons the internationally respected 2003 CIDA policy on agriculture and rural development. Sustainable livelihoods for the rural poor will largely determine the achievement of sustainable results in improved health, education and governance for the poor majorities in the priority countries. It should be a core and explicit consideration for policy and resource allocation in CIDA’s support to poverty-sensitive private sector development.


### 6. A Civil Society Policy Framework that Informs All of CIDA’s Programmatic Approaches

The IPS recognises the need to strengthen CIDA’s partnership programs with civil society and the private sector for development innovation and excellence. Yet it restricts the mandate of a proposed international panel of voluntary sector leaders to examining and improving these particular partnerships. CIDA cannot determine how partnership programs “promote excellence
and innovation in development” without considering the roles for civil society in the development process itself. This panel could play an important role in contributing to an Agency-wide civil society policy framework that informs all of CIDA’s programmatic approaches to development, whether in improved governance or local accountability. Such a policy framework already exists for CIDA’s approach to Private Sector Development, but there is no Agency framework to guide CIDA’s approach to civil society. An active and engaged civil society is crucial for achieving results in all of CIDA’s sector priorities: CIDA should develop a policy framework that sets out issues and approaches for strengthening civil society roles.

See Development, page 29.

7. Cancel the Debt

The IPS recognises that debt reduction is a critical dimension of development financing for which Canada is demonstrating renewed leadership. The Statement gives positive government support for a debt relief plan that can be supported by G7 and other international institutions and which “results in a net increase in flows to developing countries, treats non-HIPCs in an equitable manner, and preserves incentives for economic reform and improved governance”. But the IPS ignores widespread support, most recently in Canada in the Jubilee 2000 movement, for 100% unconditional debt cancellation for the world’s poorest countries. Canada’s current plan falls far short of this goal (leaving an estimated 60% to 70% of the debt of the selected highly indebted countries left to be serviced after 2015). A comprehensive and unconditional plan is essential if progress is to be made in the delivery of health, education and democratic governance which are key priorities in the IPS.

See Development, page 8.

Questions

- Will the government introduce legislation to clarify that Canada’s human rights obligation to contribute to poverty reduction is the exclusive goal of Canadian development assistance?
- When will the government join its like-minded allies among donor countries to set out a timetable for achieving aid levels at 0.7% of Canada’s GNI by 2015?
- What is the role of agriculture and rural development in CIDA’s programming strategy?
- Will the Prime Minister demonstrate his leadership at the July G8 meeting to bring forward a plan that will implement the Blair Commission for Africa’s urgent appeal for 100% debt cancellation for the poorest countries as soon as possible?
- Will Canada undertake to follow the example of the UK to have a public review of all of its policies on conditions, including tied aid that donors, including Canada, current attach to their aid and debt relief programs?
- Will CIDA develop a civil society policy framework on civil society roles in development?
CONTRIBUTING TO PEACE

8. Engaging With Failed and Fragile States

The emphasis on the challenges and dilemmas posed by failed and fragile states in the IPS is welcome. But in setting out the rationale for this policy focus, the IPS puts undue emphasis on perceived threats to Canada's security emanating from failed and fragile states. In fact, violence and human rights violations against those living in these states are global responsibilities for the international community. Canada should play an active role, working with global and local partners to address the root causes of state fragility. While the IPS statement sometimes acknowledges the human catastrophe inherent in failed and fragile states, it is silent on Canada's responsibilities in dealing with its complicity in state failure. The Government should set out clear policies to direct its work for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and socio-economic reconstruction in failed and fragile states, drawing on the expertise of those with long histories of work in such contexts. These policies should define a role for the Canadian government that is inclusive of non-state actors and centred on local change agents. The policy must also explicitly take into account that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, trade in conflict resources, irresponsible and unaccountable foreign investment, and inappropriate conditionalities on aid delivery, have exacerbated state fragility.

See Prime Minister, Forward, page 2; Overview, page 13; Development, page 0; Defence, pages 1-2.

9. The “Threat” of Global Terrorism

The IPS paints a picture of a security-centric world in which threats to Canadian lives, values and prosperity are a driving force behind policy decisions. In this regard, there is disproportionate attention paid to the threats of terrorism given the scope of the problem globally. While there are legitimate measures to be taken by countries to prevent attacks on civilians, the Government’s statement is inflammatory in its description of the terrorist threat. Failed and fragile states are posited as harbours for terrorists; investment in counter-terrorism is significantly increased to reduce vulnerability to terrorism; weapons of mass destruction are a concern because of the potential for terrorists to get a hold of them. Canadian foreign policy should be clear that the complex conflicts raging outside Canada are primarily human catastrophes - not threats to Canada’s security or potential harbours for terrorists.

See Diplomacy, pages 9 and 13 (for the $15 million counter-terrorism capacity building program); Overview, page 12; Defence, pages 1-2).

10. Small Arms and Light Weapons

Failed and fragile states do not exist in a vacuum. Recognition in the IPS of small arms proliferation as a human security issue is welcome, but small arms control initiatives are not given sufficient priority. Canada should be a leader in implementing the UN Programme of Action to control and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and work towards an Arms Trade Treaty internationally. Small arms control initiatives need substantially more human and financial resources from Canada.

See Diplomacy, pages 13-14.
11. **Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles**

The IPS mention of Canada's commitment to the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles and practice is important. Canada has played an important role in the development of these principles. The principles are key to the reform of the global humanitarian system, and ultimately, to the lives of millions of people caught up in violence and crisis globally. Whole-of-government initiatives in failed and fragile states must not compromise widely recognised principles for humanitarian action.

See *Overview*, page 13; *Development*, page 7.

12. **An Emphasis on Peace Operations for the Canadian Military**

Renewed attention to the Canadian Forces' contributions to peace operations in various conflict arenas internationally is welcome. At the same time, the *Defence* statement is excessively focused on perceived threats to Canada's security, and detailed plans for the enhanced protection of North America. While the statement describes enhanced roles for Canadian defence forces in peace operations, it does not elaborate the implications of a clear mandate on peace operations with the same precision in terms of guiding principles, approaches to training, and equipment requirements.

See Prime Minister *Forward*, pages 3 and 4 (Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar); *Overview*, page 14; *Defence*, pages 27-28; *Diplomacy*, page 11 (Darfur).

13. **A Central Role for the Responsibility to Protect in Canada’s Foreign Policy**

The Responsibility to Protect, in which Canada has played a decisive role at the UN, continues to play an important role in Canadian initiatives at the United Nations. However, civil society observers are critical of the disproportionate attention to intervention, with fewer resources devoted to prevention and rebuilding. The Responsibility to Prevent violent conflict is not recognised in the Prime Minister’s List of Responsibilities that will structure Canadian foreign policy. The full scope and dimensions of the Responsibility to Protect, including the prevention of state collapse and violence, should guide Canada’s approach “failed and fragile” states. While welcoming the Canadian initiative at the UN Security Council to clarify guidelines governing the use of force in internal conflicts, Canada should augment its capacities in internationally advancing all areas of the Responsibility.

See *Diplomacy*, page 12.

14. **Peace and Security Fund and “3D” Approach**

The IPS prescribes a key role for Foreign Affairs in promoting “whole-of-government” strategies, particularly for failed and failing states. There is, however, little reflection on the implications of this approach in the papers on *Commerce*. The new $100 million Global Peace and Security Fund is an important and welcomed step forward in coordinating and dedicating resources for effective Canadian interventions and recovery efforts in conflict situations. Initiatives supported by the Fund must be developed in partnership with those affected by
violence to protect the rights of the most vulnerable. Foreign Affairs will be directing a Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), drawing on expertise from CIDA and Defence, to develop rapid and coordinated government responses to crises as they occur. While it is true that better coordination is essential for effective external intervention in crises, the IPS goes too far, proposing integration as the goal of these efforts, rather than coordination. Defence, diplomacy and development have separate but related goals; the notion of a “three block war” for the Canadian military potentially conflates support for local peoples’ self-determined development paths with “hearts and mind” operations. Work in each field should be well communicated and coordinated, but cannot be integrated into one effort without blurring the lines between humanitarian and military action.

See Overview, pages 13 – 14; Diplomacy, page 11.

Questions

- What criteria will the government use to define and balance its priorities for intervention within failed and failing states? Currently about 80% of bilateral resources for these states are devoted to Afghanistan and Iraq.
- To what degree is the preoccupation of counter-terrorism guiding strategies and choices for Canadian interventions in failed and fragile states?
- To what extent are the unique requirements for effective peace operations a priority for Canadian defence forces and defence budget, in light of the priorities given to North American defence? Are the approach, training and equipment required for enhanced special operations for anti-terrorism consistent with the requirements for peace operations?
- How will Foreign Affairs coordinate and direct human and financial resources in its approach to the Responsibility to Protect that will include the full scope of this Responsibility?

PROMOTING TRADE JUSTICE: TRADE AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

15. Trade and Development

Canadian trade and commercial policy is driven by our economic interests, with no reference to overarching human rights obligations. While the IPS identifies the need for a level playing field in global trade rules and reductions in agricultural subsidies, the Statement advances, with unjustified certainty, that more liberalised trade is the way to move towards greater prosperity for all countries. There is insufficient emphasis on the need for policy space for developing countries to carve out locally-owned development strategies, whether for agriculture, health, or industrial development. Through an exclusive “development” focus on improving market access and assistance to help developing countries “adjust” to globalised markets, the IPS also neglects key development issues at play in the Round, including food security, access to medicine, preference erosion and liberalisation of essential services. To put producers from around the world on a “level playing field” requires substantive changes in trade rules (e.g. measures to address dumping and disciplines on corporate practice), not just subsidy reform. There is commitment to defend Canada’s right to orderly marketing structures but not poor countries’ right to manage trade/borders for the same purpose. There is also no discussion of food security proposals currently under consideration in the WTO, such as food security crop exemptions.

See Overview, page 18, Commerce, pages 1 and 12.
16. WTO and Governance

The IPS reaffirms Canada’s commitment to a rules-based multilateral trading system and the pivotal role of the WTO in global architecture. However the IPS highlights the WTO only as a positive governance model, with no recognition of its fragility, its continued inequitable power dynamics, the significant internal and citizen mobilisation against its undemocratic decision-making, or the implications of these for development prospects in the Round.

See Overview, page 18; Commerce, page 22.

Questions

☐ Does the government believe developing countries should have more flexibility to determine their own development strategies, including the scope and pace of liberalisation, as suggested by the Commission for Africa?

☐ Will the Government advocate for more democratic decision-making at the WTO including for the Hong Kong Ministerial?

☐ Given the extended timeframe of subsidy reform, what measures will Canada support to ensure developing country farmers can trade on fair footing in their local markets?

17. Private Sector Development as Poverty Reduction

The Statement’s focus on addressing the needs of small and medium sized entrepreneurs, particularly in the informal economy, is positive. There is also a consistent focus on women entrepreneurs, which is important. The strategy lacks, however, an explicit focus on agriculture and rural development as a key sectoral entry point for Private Sector Development (PSD) (see point 4 above). The IPS’s review of the enabling environment for the domestic private sector in developing countries, for example, stresses enterprise registration, and procedural and government regulatory laws, but has no reference to specific needs of rural farmers as entrepreneurs – for example, to land and other core assets. The focus on helping rural entrepreneurs to supply local and international markets is positive. However, the example provided does not emphasize (as did the recent Blair Commission for Africa) the strategic and development imperative of prioritizing local and regional markets and boosting agricultural productivity. There are no references to privatization of services through loan conditions imposed by the International Financial Institutions or in trade policy.

See Development, pages 17-18.

18. Capacity Building in Private Sector Development

The capacity building dimensions of PSD as set out in the IPS focus on financial and technical issues such as government regulations. Absent is the priority to address the capacity of poor farmers, of workers, or entrepreneurs to organize to claim rights – to land, to policy dialogue, to unions, to equality of opportunity.

See Development, pages 17-18.
19. Corporate Accountability

The IPS’s acknowledgement that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an issue for Canadian policy in the *Commerce* paper is important, as is reference to corporate responsibility in relation to the Canadian Investment Fund for Africa. However, key elements – such as the inclusion of mandatory standards and transparency regarding which companies and projects are receiving Canadian assistance – are not signalled. The Government also acknowledges the problem of the financial supports for conflict being sourced through illicit trade in resources, but gives no specific indication of its plans to deal with Canadian responsibilities in this regard. CSR strategies are poorly elaborated and not sufficiently prioritized in the document. There is no reference to key international policy processes underway to address corporate accountability through the UN Human Rights Commission. Much work remains to address the regulatory gap in Canada's national laws to deal with cases in which the activities of Canadian companies exacerbate or perpetuate violent conflict and human rights violations.

See *Commerce*, page 22 (corporate social responsibility); *Diplomacy*, page 14 (international agreements to halt illicit trade in resources that sustain conflict); *Diplomacy*, page 22 (CIFA).

Questions

- If the most common entrepreneur in developing countries is the farmer, how will Canada’s PSD strategies address their need to better meet demands in local and regional markets?
- Will capacity building for the private sector include a focus on organizing capacity among the poor – women, workers, farmers – to advocate for their interests?
- Will Canada ensure full transparency and mandatory human rights standards for the Investment Fund for Africa?
- Will the Government link financial and other forms of public support offered to Canadian companies operating overseas to human rights and environmental standards?

JUMPSTARTING MULTILATERALISM

20. The Centrality of The United Nations

The IPS underscores the centrality and relevance of the United Nations for global governance, although it is vague in rooting Canadian policies within the Charter and principles that guide the United Nations system. Canada will put significant energy into UN reform, but only in specific identified areas such as the Security Council, a new Peacebuilding Commission and a Human Rights Council. ECOSOC receives no attention. On the one hand, the IPS provides strong affirmation of the importance of overhauling multilateral institutions to address global equity and re-balance participation between North and South in global governance. On the other hand, these principles seem to be in tension with the notion that Canada will pursue reform only so far as it serves particular Canadian policy goals (“Canada…will put outcomes ahead of process”). While the government does not specifically support one Security Council reform proposal over another (according to options laid out in the recent UN High Level Report), the Statement is clear about Canada’s resistance to new permanent members or new vetoes, and acknowledges
the need for better representation on the Security Council with regional elected term positions. Institutions that are centrally important in addressing global poverty, namely, the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF, are not identified as priority projects for democratic reform. Increasing the access of civil society to policy dialogue in multilateral fora is also absent in the IPS as a policy issue.

See Prime Minister’s *Forward; Overview*, pages 26-27; *Diplomacy*, pages 15 and 21.

21. **Human Rights**

The overall approach to human rights in the IPS is weak, described as a core value of Canada, but not treated as a matter of international law. State obligations to promote rights are not addressed as a compelling policy imperative for trade, security or development policy. Good governance is addressed primarily through promotion of institutional reform through technical expertise from Canada, not as support to citizens to claim their rights and build their own society. However, in the multilateral system, the IPS signals that Canada intends to support the proposed reform of the Human Rights Commission and the creation of a Human Rights Council.

See *Diplomacy*, page 17.

22. **L-20 and the United Nations**

The Leaders level G-20 clearly remains a priority for the Paul Martin government, though the Statement indicates that the first meeting could take some time. The L-20 is an important initiative that has the potential for breaking through some of the current blocks in inter-state relations for a multilateral reform agenda. However, on the issue of representation, there is no commitment in the IPS to address either the issue of making it open to poor countries or CSOs. Similarly, there is no commitment to ensure that it contributes to, rather than undermines, UN effectiveness and reform.

See Prime Minister’s *Forward; Diplomacy*, page 21.

**Questions**

- How will the government ensure a whole-of-government approach to our human rights obligations in international policy?
- How will Canada work to ensure a new L-20 forum would strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations as the overarching framework for multilateral problem solving?
- How will Canada ensure that the interests of the poorest countries are addressed in an L-20 and that civil society organizations can contribute to its deliberations?
ENGAGING CANADA S AS GLOBAL CITIZENS

23. Transparency, Dialogue and Debate

The IPS presents some important signals regarding transparency, including a commitment to an integrated annual report and parliamentary debate on development cooperation. If resources were provided, this could present an ideal opportunity for parliamentarians to engage their constituencies on key issues relating to Canada’s role in the world. Expanding this debate to include all areas of Canada’s international policy would ensure that Canadians are kept informed on the broader range of issues and able to see the links and gaps between Canada’s actions. There are references to engaging Canadians in dialogue in the Development paper, but they are linked to comments about awareness and understanding. It is not clear if the latter includes participation in policy dialogue. The discussion in the Diplomacy paper about building policy capacity makes no mention of either public or civil society roles. This lack of consistency on public engagement must be explicitly addressed by expanding opportunities and mechanisms for dialogue and debate on Canada’s “whole-of-government” international policy.

See Development, pages 28 and 29 (parliamentary debate); Diplomacy, page 30.

24. Role of Civil Society

The central role played by civil society as a vehicle for wider citizen engagement is acknowledged with a commitment to intensify the role of civil society partners. This includes collaborating with NGOs through Canada Corps; engaging the sector in its efforts to build support and capacity across the country; significantly expanding public engagement efforts by building on CIDA’s Development Information Program; acknowledging the role of providing policy advocacy and formulation, and the creation of a panel that includes civil society leaders to review programs in order to promote excellence and innovation (see point 5 above).

See Development, page 28 (Canada Corps); page 29 (role in advocacy).

25. Vision for Global Citizenship

The importance of “active involvement of Canadians” is acknowledged in the introduction to the Diplomacy paper, and it is important to see “advancing values of global citizenship” as one of the first objectives in the Development paper. Unfortunately, the concept never appears in the Overview paper, and the nature of Canadians’ involvement is never substantiated in the Diplomacy paper. The discussion of “public diplomacy” does focus on cross-cultural education opportunities to help build awareness, but it is largely about Canadians promoting themselves and Canadian interests. The vision of “global citizenship” elaborated in the Development paper is a narrow one, remaining tied to past notions of “educating the public” about Canada’s role in the world and seeing Canadians as the experts ‘helping’ communities overseas in need. “Active Global Citizenship” is not a new term for old behaviours. It is about critical reflection on our values and obligations, it is about collaborative learning with fellow citizens around the world, and it is about ethical decisions and actions taken here and abroad. It is not about solving, or helping to solve, problems as if they belong only to others. The knowledge building element of
the Canada Corps is a positive step, but it focuses on sharing “among Canadians” and is limited to the issue of governance. It misses the opportunity to enable a mutually beneficial process where Canadians work in partnership with peoples in the South on many issues.

See Development, pages 1, 2 and 28 (Canada Corps); Diplomacy, pages 32-33.

### 26. Pursuing a Strategy

The government will pursue a renewed and more vigorous strategy for public engagement. Canada Corps is given a very high profile as one of the mechanisms through which the strategy will work. Unfortunately the pursuit of a strategy has been ongoing for a number of years; the IPS should have been the opportunity to present it. This emphasis on the Canada Corps mechanism, along with the orientation to public engagement in the IPS, raises the question of whether the opportunities will be limited for other more diverse or innovative approaches to engagement.

See Development, page 29.

#### Questions

- In what ways will the government’s public engagement strategy be inclusive of a modern vision of citizens actively engaging in Canada and abroad?
- How is the whole-of-government approach being applied to ensure Canadians have opportunities to learn about, and have a role to influence, Canada’s role in the world?
- How will the government commit to effectively engaging the Canadian public through parliamentarians and civil society organizations, on the wider spectrum of issues related to Canada’s role in the world?

### ASIA PACIFIC WORKING GROUP

#### 27. China and India – Emerging Economic Giants

According to the IPS, China and India will no longer receive Canadian bilateral aid, but will instead be regarded as emerging economic giants with which to increase trade. By 2010, Canada hopes to exceed $2 billion in exports to India and double the level of economic exchanges with China. However, China’s egregious human rights record, and persistent internal and international tensions are reasons for concern. Also, the level and type of economic growth in both China and India will have serious implications for the global environment, especially global climate change and resource depletion.

How will Canada ensure that human rights and environmental frameworks will guide trade and investment relationships with these two countries?
28. “Non-Priority” ODA Recipients

Of the core group of 25 countries in which CIDA will focus its resources by 2010, six are in the Asia Pacific Region. These countries are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam; no countries in the Pacific are eligible for priority bilateral aid. However, with three key exceptions, much of the core country focus remains the same. Previous to the IPS, seven core countries in Asia received 80% of bilateral ODA – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The IPS removes China and Afghanistan from Canada’s bilateral focus countries list, and adds Cambodia. With the new focus, several countries in the Asia Pacific region are not eligible for priority ODA. Many of these same countries are in or recovering from violent conflicts, including Afghanistan, the Philippines, Nepal, Timor Leste, Laos, and Thailand.

Will Canada remain engaged in these countries with non-priority ODA, and if so, what will be the nature of this engagement?

29. Canadian Investment in the Region

Many Canadian companies are significant investors in the Asia Pacific region. Too often, companies are complicit in human rights abuses and environmental destruction in their host countries – notably in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Burma. While the IPS makes mention of Corporate Social Responsibility (see above), there is no firm commitment to address regulatory gaps in Canadian laws to ensure such “responsibility”.

AMERICAS POLICY GROUP

30. Primacy of Trade Among Objectives for Latin America

The IPS makes clear Canada’s continued priority on extending the existing model of free trade agreements in the region. Canada intends to conclude negotiations of the Canada-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CA4FTA), strengthen trade relations with Brazil, and pursue trade negotiations with members of the Caribbean Community and Andean nations. There is no consideration given to the need to re-examine the impacts of free trade, including the implications of investor-state clauses, which have been the subject of great public concern, especially in the three NAFTA countries. There is no description of how trade objectives will be pursued within a whole-of-government approach that balances our human rights and development commitments with our commercial interests. Moreover, the statement does not commit to civil society participation, transparency, and considerations of human rights and democracy in the negotiating process of free trade agreements, despite Canada’s past work on this in the Free Trade Agreement for the Americas process.

How will Canada ensure that its trade objectives in the Americas, including new bilateral and regional deals, are pursued in a transparent and accountable manner that is rooted in our human rights and development commitments in the region?

31. Human Rights in Latin America

Canada’s goals within Latin America and the Caribbean include strengthening democracy good governance and human rights. However, the statement’s description of Canada’s engagement in the area focuses on security concerns and economic interests. For example, Colombia – which has been a major focus for human rights advocacy for Canadian civil society and the Canadian government, is mentioned only as an area of security concern. There is no further treatment of the country or the role Canada will play towards it. Canada requires a more integrated approach that addresses human rights as fundamental obligations under international law and that considers the deeply-rooted causes of human rights violations such as wide-spread inequality and poverty, and democracy and governance issues.


How does Canada plan on ensuring a leadership role for Canada on human rights in the hemisphere?

AFRICA-CANADA FORUM

32. Reversing the Impoverishment of Africa

The IPS recognises the increased impoverishment of Africa in the last decade, and commits increased resources and attention to Africa through various mechanisms. Aid resources will double between 2003 and 2008, and in the proposed IPS framework, 14 African countries are included in the 25 selected core aid partners. However, the government’s analysis does not identify the root causes of poverty in Africa, or question the responsibilities of donor countries and multilateral institutions, in particular the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization in this process of impoverishment. An international trade regime more respectful of the sovereignty of African countries and 100% unconditional debt cancellation are crucial steps to be taken if the world is to live up to its responsibility towards Africans.

See Development, page 3.

33. Policy Coherence and African Poverty

According to the IPS, donors have taken the responsibility to bring greater coherence to their policies beyond aid to address the challenges of development. The focus of Canada’s trade agenda on the WTO and access to markets is seen as the response to the inclusion of Africa in the global economy. This approach ignores the numerous criticisms regarding the lack of democratic process in the WTO, and the needs of developing countries to pursue their own economic policies to support rural and agricultural development, diversify their economies, and
promote equity and poverty reduction in accordance with local specific realities. The report of
the Commission for Africa, endorsed by Minister Goodale, recognises that forced and rapid
liberalisation has been destructive. Genuine “local ownership” of economic planning in Africa
has to be respected.


34. Addressing the Challenges of Peace and Security in Africa

Canada has demonstrated leadership in the development of a human security agenda, the creation
of the International Criminal Court, and more recently, the elaboration of the concept of the
Responsibility to Protect. The IPS recognises the dramatic reality of Africans, affected by
numerous wars and conflicts, and the need to support African institutions to build the capacities
to prevent and respond to conflicts. Darfur is the focus of Government attention in this regard.
Although the IPS states that over 5 million people have died in recent years from conflicts (of
which about 3 million in DRC alone), the situation in DRC and Ivory Coast are given little
attention in the document. Given the importance of these countries for economic and political
regional stability and security, this omission is worrying.

34. Canada’s Commitment to the G8 Africa Plan of Action

The IPS reaffirms Canada’s interest in helping to reverse the region’s social, economic and
political marginalization, and to drastically improve all indices of African development, peace
and security, and governance. The $500 million Canada Fund for Africa is the main tool to
promote democratic reform. South Africa is seen as a key ally to achieve this goal in the region.
The 5 year Fund was created following the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, as the Canadian
commitment in the G8 Action Plan for Africa. While the issues the government seeks to address
through the Fund require long term commitment, there is no indication as to how this will
continue beyond the 5 year termination date.


35. Canadian Investment Fund for Africa

Private sector development is a key element of the IPS. Through PSD programming Canada
intends to pursue its promotion of an open, rules-based trading system, and to continue spreading
the benefits of new technologies. Building capacity in African private sector actors is a key
focus. The goal is to make markets work for the poor and compete globally. The Canadian
Investment Fund for Africa (CIFA), an initiative supported by the Canada Fund, will allow for
commercial ventures, and provide risk capital to support growth-generating private investments.
For over 2 years now, ACF/CCIC has been requesting without success more information and
transparency from CIDA regarding the governance structure of CIFA, and more specifically the
criteria for the selection of participants. With only 2 years remaining for the Canada Fund, CIFA
has not yet been launched.

See Development, page 17.